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1When households are not fully informed about the environmen-
tal concern of a new policymaker, the latter may use environmental
taxes as signals for environmental friendliness. In this context, the
"lemons" are the green policymakers: they have an incentive to distort
upward environmental taxes in an attempt to masquerade as brown
policymakers. To fully reveal her environmental concern, the brown
policymaker must pay a signaling cost by overtaxing, hence polluting
less than required by the Pigovian principle. Selection among perfect
Bayesian Equilibria shows that uninformative taxes may prevail over
informative taxes depending on households￿prior beliefs about the
policymaker￿ s preferences.
Keywords: Pigovian tax, Signaling.
JEL Code: D82, H21, H23, Q28.
2Lemons are Green:
The Informative Role of Pigovian Tax
1 Introduction
As pointed by the large and rapidly growing literature on optimal taxation
(see, for instance, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) or Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994)), the environmental tax is widely regarded as both an e¢ cient
instrument for internalizing the marginal social damage from pollution and
an e⁄ective device for raising public revenue. The usual assumption made
by the literature that information is perfect casually dismisses the question
of how private information interacts with policymakers￿behaviors.
When a new policymaker comes into o¢ ce, households might not be fully
informed about her concern for the environment. However, households can
make inferences about the environmental friendliness of the policymaker by
observing policy actions such as the choice of an environmental tax that is
made by the policymaker. In this paper, we present a model based on such
an asymmetric information, in which environmental taxes may potentially
be used as signals for the unobservable policymaker￿ s concern for the envi-
ronment. Identifying this concern with the environmental damage resulting
from the policymaker￿ s behavior, we investigate conditions under which an
environmental tax is fully revealing the severity of the damage, hence the
3policymaker￿ s concern for the environment. It turns out that households￿
prior beliefs about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment matter in
selecting among multiple equilibria, which are as usual of two kinds: either
separating equilibria in which the policymaker transmit all information on
her environmental concern by committing on the environmental tax early in
her term of o¢ ce, or pooling equilibria in which ￿green￿and ￿brown￿pol-
icymakers choose tax alike and so convey no information to households on
their true concern for the environment.
Perhaps the most surprising result of the model is the emergence of op-
portunistic behaviors coming from green policymakers, due to their infor-
mational advantage. When households believe more likely a policymaker to
be brown at the time she comes into o¢ ce, the latter has no incentive to
thwart this belief, even though she is actually green. The green policymaker
may rather raise the environmental tax above the Pigovian tax, which fully
internalizes the marginal social damage from pollution, in an attempt to im-
itate the behavior of a brown policymaker. This increases the households￿
perceived utility, thereby boosting the private component of social welfare.
Obviously, pooling strategies entail a welfare loss to the brown policymaker
since the environmental tax falls short of the actual marginal production
damage from pollution caused by her policy. This loss, however, may be less
than the cost that the brown policymaker should incur to signal her envi-
ronmental concern to households, especially when they initially believe more
4likely that the policymaker is brown. As a result, separation is achieved with
perfectly informative taxes when consumers hold high prior beliefs that the
policymaker is green, whereas pooling equilibrium taxes emerge when con-
sumers initially assign a high probability to the brown policymaker. In some
sense, pessimistic beliefs on the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment
freeze information.
There is some analogy with the lemons problem described by Akerlof
(1970): ￿bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it is impossible for
a buyer to tell the di⁄erence between a good and a bad car; only the seller
knows￿ . Similarly, a green policymaker sets the same environmental tax as a
brown policymaker because households cannot ascertain the environmental
friendliness of the policymaker and, moreover, hold pessimistic prior beliefs
about her environmental concern. Here, however, the bad type who has an
incentive to withhold the truth is the green policymaker with a high-quality
environment. As far as the environmental friendliness of policymakers is
concerned, lemons are green.
There are a variety of reasons why households and policymakers are likely
to have di⁄erent informations and beliefs about the degradation of the natural
environment, hence di⁄erent preferences concerning the policy stance on the
environment. A ￿rst reason given by Boyer and La⁄ont (1999) is that the
policymaker generally has superior knowledge of the environmental damage
because she is endowed with superior data from con￿dential reports of the
5public service bureaucracy. A second reason also mentioned by Boyer and
La⁄ont (1999) is that the policymaker￿ s scienti￿c information on nonveri￿able
environmental variables may be costly to communicate. This argument is
reinforced by the evidence that scienti￿c opinion on the extent to which
pollution harms the environment is changing rapidly as new information
comes to light. Recalling the experience of the Montreal Protocol, Pearce
(1991) notes that ￿the scale of the threat from chloro￿ uorocarbons has been
revised upwards several times￿ . A third reason households have perceptions
of the environmental damage di⁄erent from the policymaker￿ s perceptions is
because the mass media systematically confront the public with a lopsided
version of reality giving the impression that the global environment is in
the worst shape1. Even if households were little in￿ uenced by the images
and messages on television and in the newspapers, the assumption that they
have the same information about the environmental damage as does the
policymaker is unlikely to be met in reality because households usually lack
the technical ability required for a sound assessment of the environmental
damages.
The consequences of asymmetric information between households and the
1According to Lomborg (2001), the environmental message delivered on television and
in the newspapers is generally characterized by a tendency to overemphasize pessimistic
viewpoints. To illustrate what he calls the ￿Litany￿of our ever deteriorating environment,
Lomborg quotes assertions found in the newspapers such as ￿everyone knows the planet is
in bad shape￿(Herstgaard (2000), ￿A global green deal￿ , Time 155 (17): 84-85), or ￿the
burning of fossil fuels is endangering the lives of millions... we are heading for cataclysm￿
(The April 2001 Global Environment Supplement from New Scientist).
6policymaker in the present context is that consumption decisions regarding
polluting goods may deviate from what would be socially optimal from the
policymaker￿ s viewpoint. To the extent that the perceptions by households
of the environmental concern of the policymaker are in￿ uenced by her be-
havior, the choice of environmental taxes by the policymaker has a role to
play in eliminating the di⁄erence in perceptions. This extends the role of
the environmental taxes beyond that, traditionally emphasized by the envi-
ronmental literature, of an e¢ cient instrument for internalizing the adverse
external e⁄ects of pollution. However, using environmental taxes to convey
information to households may in turn lead the policymaker to distort such
taxes from levels implied by the Pigovian principle.
In a ￿rst version of the model, the policymaker cannot commit herself to
a level of environmental tax. Hence, the beliefs held by households about the
preferences of the policymaker and the corresponding environmental damage
are not in￿ uenced by the policymaker￿ s decisions. In equilibrium, the poli-
cymaker￿ s choice of the so-called ￿discretionary￿tax is not only a weighted
average of the polluting externalities caused by each household￿ s consump-
tion as in Diamond (1973), but it also takes into account the di⁄erence in
beliefs between the policymaker and the households. If households perceive
the environmental damage to be higher (resp. lower) than what the policy-
maker actually thinks, then the policymaker must distort the tax downward
(resp. upward) relative to what would require the Pigovian principle were
7households to have the same beliefs as the policymaker. The analysis of the
discretionary tax policy provides the preliminary and crucial insight that the
policymaker prefers households to perceive herself as brown, regardless of her
true concern for the environment. When households believe more likely that
the policymaker is little concerned about the environment, they expect the
polluting good to be cheap since cleanup costs are thought to be low. Hence,
pessimistic beliefs boost the private component of social welfare.
The second version of the model assumes that environmental taxes are
enforceable. The policymaker￿ s commitment to abide by her tax choice may
come from the rule of law or the policymaker￿ s willingness to build up a
reputation for the credibility of her environmental policy. If households are
not fully informed about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment in
a regime that involves some commitment on tax, they will condition their
beliefs on environmental taxes and the policymaker will choose how much
information to reveal by setting taxes. We investigate the existence and the
nature of perfect Bayesian equilibria in this signaling context. It is shown
that separating equilibria exist in which the policymaker transmits all infor-
mation on her environmental concern with a tax that is above (resp. equal to)
the symmetric information Pigovian level when she is brown (resp. green).
This case arises when the welfare obtained by the brown policymaker with
her symmetric information Pigovian tax makes the green policymaker envi-
ous. Employing the logic of Undefeated Equilibrium proposed by Mailath,
8Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993), we single out the separating equi-
librium in which a brown policymaker distorts the environmental tax the
minimum necessary to persuade households that she is actually brown, and
a green policymaker behaves according to the Pigovian principle under sym-
metric information. A rough intuitive explanation for this surprising result is
easy to provide. There are two components of social welfare, namely private
welfare which depends on households￿subjective beliefs, and environmental
quality. Private welfare is a⁄ected by how much information is transmitted.
Households have the impression to get higher utility when they believe the
policymaker to be brown, because the dirty good is expected to be cheaper in
a more polluted environment. Thus, a green policymaker has an incentive to
mimic the brown policymaker and impose a high tax in order to trick house-
holds into believing that the environmental damage is severe. Under precise
circumstances, the only way for a brown policymaker to transmit all informa-
tion on her type is to distort the environmental tax, hence reduce polluting
wastes, even more than what would be implied by the Pigovian principle
under symmetric information. Necessary conditions for environmental taxes
to be informative are that, ￿rst, increasing tax is more detrimental to the
green policymaker than it is to her brown counterpart, and second, cleanup
costs are lower when the policymaker is brown. Under such conditions, up-
ward deviations from the brown policymaker￿ s Pigovian tax emerge when the
welfare obtained with this tax makes the green policymaker envious.
9The selection of undefeated equilibria shows, however, that pooling equi-
libria prevail over the least-cost separating equilibrium when households be-
lieve more likely the policymaker to be brown. In other words, no infor-
mation will be revealed through environmental taxes when households have
pessimistic prior beliefs about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment.
In such circumstances, the green policymaker has a strong incentive to mimic,
which raises the signaling cost for the brown policymaker. The latter is better
o⁄ concealing her true environmental concern from households even though
the undefeated pooling equilibrium taxes are distorted downward relative to
the symmetric information Pigovian level, which yields more polluting wastes
and a welfare loss. By contrast, undefeated pooling equilibrium taxes reduce
pollution even more than under the symmetric information Pigovian level
since they are distorted upward.
Our conclusion that environmental taxes may be distorted for reasons
of signaling contributes to the existing literature in identifying the various
causes of potential deviations from the Pigovian tax. Considering monop-
olistic competition, Barnett (1980) has clari￿ed Buchanan￿ s observation in
Buchanan (1969) that underproduction of a monopoly and the overproduc-
tion due to an externality may compensate each other so that second best
optimal taxes may be less than marginal environmental damages. Besides
market power, the assumption of asymmetric information, especially between
the environmental regulator and economic agents, has provided noteworthy
10reasons why optimal environmental taxes should deviate from levels implied
by the Pigovian principle. The context of asymmetric information that has
received greatest attention is that pioneered by Baron (1985) and accurately
investigated thereafter by La⁄ont (1994) and Lewis (1996): polluters are
more informed than regulators about the costs and bene￿ts of pollution re-
duction. A general result emerging from this literature is that environmental
taxes should be used by the regulator as means of providing polluters with
the correct incentives for fully reporting their information. Along this line,
La⁄ont (1994) examines to what extent Pigovian taxes are distorted so as to
reduce the polluter￿ s rent of asymmetric information.
Our model essentially di⁄ers from the incentive regulation literature in
that the policymaker has an informational advantage over economic agents.
Perhaps the closest relationship is with the hypothesis in Barigozzi and Vil-
leneuve (2004) that agents are less informed than the government on the e⁄ect
of their consumption. The authors analyze optimal taxation in a second-best
world in which raising public funds is costly for the government. As a result,
the latter must distort the Ramsey-Sandmo tax downward to fully reveal
to agents the detrimental e⁄ect of their consumption. The presence of so-
cial costs of raising public funds proves to be crucial for the emergence of
signaling distortions. By contrast, no such costs are assumed in our frame-
work which deliberately deals with a world without distortionary taxes when
symmetric information prevails. A second major di⁄erence is that Barigozzi
11and Villeneuve consider that the government is privately informed on the
adverse e⁄ects of individual consumption. In this paper, the policymaker is
privately informed on both her environmental preferences and the polluting
externalities due to households￿consumption.
Other authors have explored the strategic behavior of a policymaker un-
der the assumption that households are uncertain about her preferences. For
instance, Barro (1986) builds a multiperiod model on such an assumption
to show that a monetary authority may ￿nd it optimal to commit herself to
a rule and build up a reputation that will cause households to believe her
announcements. The presence of asymmetric information induces a policy-
maker to keep initial in￿ ation down for reasons of signaling in the two-period
analysis of Vickers (1986)). When voters are not fully informed about the
preferences of the policymaker, the electoral behavior of the latter is shown
by Alesina and Cukierman (1990) to be more ambiguous than under com-
plete information. All these works, like ours, draw on the seminal articles in
the literature of industrial organization by Milgrom and Roberts (1982 and
1986) who considered the ￿rst models in which a ￿rm uses prices, among
other variables, to signal its private information either on production costs
or on product quality.
The signaling game investigated here shares some essential structural
properties with the signaling games that have been extensively analyzed in
Cho and Kreps (1987) and Cho and Sobel (1990) on the basis of the well-
12known model of Spence (1974). First, the types of the policymaker can be
ordered in such a way that the brown policymaker is more willing to choose
higher taxes than is the green policymaker. This is another instance of the
familiar single-crossing property. Another usual property which is satis￿ed
by our model is stochastic dominance: whatever her true environmental con-
cern, the policymaker prefers households to believe her more likely to be
brown.
Moreover, the present model is somewhat reminiscent of the informed
principal￿ s model with common values developed by Maskin and Tirole (1992)
in that the private information of the policymaker who plays here the role
of a principal, is an argument of the household-agent￿ s objective function.
A major di⁄erence is that, in our setting, the signaling activity takes place
before contracting in the spirit of the Spencian education model. A common
feature with Maskin and Tirole (1992) is that the concept of Weakly Interim
E¢ ciency introduced by these authors to restrict the set of incentive com-
patible allocations has the same ￿ avor as the logic of Undefeated Equilibrium
proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993), which is used
here to re￿ne equilibria and focus on the most ￿reasonable￿ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of envi-
ronmental taxation under asymmetric information and states some useful
properties. Section 3 investigates discretionary taxation by assuming that
the policymaker cannot make binding commitments. Section 4 analyzes the
13enforceable tax policy and the role of environmental tax as a signal of the pol-
icymaker￿ s environmental concern. Section 5 o⁄ers conclusions and proposes
some extensions of the model.
2 The model
A new policymaker has come into o¢ ce in an economy made up by N house-
holds with identical preferences. The households cannot ascertain the envi-
ronmental friendliness of the policymaker. They believe there are two possi-
ble types of policymaker, the brown and the green. The brown policymaker
cares less about the environment than the green, hence the brown policy is
characterized by laxer cleanup standards and more severe damages from pol-
lution than is the green policy. A coe¢ cient of polluting wastes denoted by
b " re￿ ects the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment. This coe¢ cient is
not observed by the households ex ante. It can be considered as an estimate
of the environmental damage on which the policymaker in o¢ ce has superior
information because she is better equipped than households, as suggested by
Boyer and La⁄ont (1999). The information initially available to households
is described as follows: they believe the policymaker is brown ("b) with a
commonly known probability ￿0 2 (0;1), and green ("g) with probability
141 ￿ ￿0, and 0 < "g < "b2. Let b "(￿) ￿ ￿"b + (1 ￿ ￿)"g be the households￿
perception of the environmental damage when they assign probability ￿ to
the brown policymaker. The household￿ s utility depends on one public good,
namely environmental quality E, and two private goods: consumption of
a polluting good x and labor l which is taken as the numeraire. Assume
that environmental quality does not directly a⁄ect private demand and there
are no income e⁄ects on the polluting good sector, hence the representative
household i￿ s utility function U(xi;li;E) takes the quasi-linear form:




;b "(￿)) ￿ li; (1)
where u(xi) is bounded above and twice di⁄erentiable with u00(xi) < 03
at all xi ￿ 0 and u(0) = 0. Throughout the paper, subscripts i (resp.
superscripts j) and masculine (resp. feminine) pronouns refer to households
(resp. policymaker).
Environmental quality deteriorates with pollution, which is directly re-




to the linear relationship E(x;b "(￿)) = ￿b "(￿)x: this corresponds to measur-
ing wastes in units proportional to the social damage caused by pollution.
2The assumption that households￿information is binary, i. e., valuation b " lies in the
￿nite set f"g;"bg, is without loss of generality in the sense that it could easily be extended
to the case of a random variable described by a cumulative distribution function and a




3As usual, primes denote derivatives.
15With subjective belief ￿, ￿b "(￿)x represents the households￿perception of the
environmental damage (or environmental bene￿t from pollution reduction).
The polluting good is produced from labor alone with a constant-returns-
to-scale technology. Consumption of the good is assumed to leave a waste
residue. This requires cleanup activities that consume economic resources.
The whole technology (production plus cleanup) is represented by the fol-
lowing cost function c(x;") = c(")x which incorporates the cleanup costs.
Cleanup costs depend on the environmental target of the policymaker. Con-
sider for instance a junk automobile. With a brown policymaker, the junk
automobile will be abandoned on the parkway or the river bank, whereas
a green policymaker will charge car manufacturers the incremental costs of
collection and disposal. As the preferences of the green policymaker for a
low environmental damage involve high costs of cleanup for ￿rms, a nat-
ural assumption is c0(") < 04, hence marginal production costs are higher
with a green type than with a brown type. Firms are assumed to have the
same information about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment as
do households. When the public believes that the policymaker is the brown
type with probability ￿, the marginal cost of producing the polluting good
is expected to be b c(￿) ￿ ￿c("b) + (1 ￿ ￿)c("g).
At the time of trading the polluting good, ￿rms facing uncertain cleanup
4The idea that a cleaner environment requires adjustment in cleanup at the expense
of more labor input is similar to that in Copeland and Taylor (1994) or Yu (2005) for an
abatement technology.
16costs make the production decision that determines the price p of the pollut-
ing good. Competition among ￿rms drives pro￿ts to zero, thus equilibrium is
achieved in the polluting good market when p = b c(￿)5. If the true production
costs c("j) turn out to be lower (higher) than the expected cost b c(￿), then
pro￿ts will be positive (negative). Let ￿j (￿) ￿ [b c(￿) ￿ c("j)]￿N
i=1xi denote
the aggregate expected pro￿ts.
The policymaker can levy a green tax t on polluting consumption. Let
T ￿ [0;+1) be the set of possible taxes for each policymaker. It will
be assumed, as in Diamond (1973), that any tax revenue is returned to
households via lump-sum transfers T.
In addition to his wage income and the lump-sum transfer T=N, each
household receives income from a share s of the aggregate expected pro￿ts
￿j (￿), which is no higher than 1=N 6. The budget constraint for household
i amounts to:
(b c(￿) + t)xi = li + T=N + s￿
j (￿): (2)
Households are rational and maximize the expected value of utility. When
5This can be achieved by assuming that several ￿rms compete ￿ la Bertrand by si-
multaneously setting prices for the polluting good, under the assumption that all ￿rms
hold the same beliefs about the environmental damage regardless of whether the observed
choice of tax is on or o⁄ the equilibrium path. Another way to build this assumption
into the model would be to replace the competing ￿rms with a ￿ctitious player called the
market.
6When s is set strictly lower than 1=N, it indicates that whereas all the households
reside in the policymaker￿ s juridiction, some of the owners of the ￿rms are likely to reside
outside her juridiction.
17they decide on the consumption of polluting good, they are assumed to take
into account the adverse e⁄ect of their personal polluting consumption on





) ￿ (b c(￿) + t)xi + T=N + s￿
j (￿): (3)





= b c(￿) + t: (4)
The right-hand side of (4) gives the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and the polluting good. It must be equal to the relevant marginal
rate of transformation, that is, the expected marginal cost of producing the
polluting good plus the environmental tax. By solving equation (4), we can
write the individual demand for the polluting good as a function of the price
to household i and his belief that the policymaker is brown, that is, Xi(t;￿).
Assume that there exists a maximum polluting tax t￿ inside T such that
u0(0) = b c(￿) +
b "(￿)
N + t￿.
Di⁄erentiating (4) yields the following partial derivatives for all t 2 T







where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
Hence, each demand function is non increasing with tax and, for N su¢ -
ciently large, increasing with the probability that the policymaker is brown.
Households consume more when they believe the policymaker to be brown
because they perceive marginal cost of producing the polluting good to be
low. Consequently, when the true type of policymaker is "g and households
believe her type to be "b with probability ￿ > 0, there is a ￿price illusion￿
in the sense that households think the polluting good to be less costly to








0(") + 1=N < 0: (6)
The meaning of inequality (6) is that, in our economy, the individual
marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction 1=N is lower than the
marginal cleanup cost ￿c0("), whatever the households￿perceptions of the
policymaker￿ s concern for the environment.
Let vi(t;￿) denote household i￿ s indirect utility function gross of the pol-
19lution damage caused by the others￿consumption, given subjective beliefs
￿:
vi(t;￿) ￿ u(Xi(t;￿))￿b "(￿)Xi(t;￿)=N ￿(b c(￿) + t)Xi(t;￿)+T=N +s￿
j (￿):
(7)
Market equilibrium for the polluting good is such that total output must
equal the sum of individual consumptions:
￿
N
i=1li = b c(￿)￿
N
i=1Xi(t;￿): (8)
Let us consider the ￿rst best outcome when households buy a positive
quantity of the dirty good. A policymaker of type j aims to maximize wel-
fare measured by ￿N
i=1U(xi;li;E(x;"j)) subject to the decentralized optimiz-
ing behavior of households. Hence, the policymaker￿ s objectives re￿ ect the
households￿preferences and beliefs. Treating all individuals identically, we
can omit subscript i and rewrite market equilibrium from (8) as:
Nb c(￿)X(t;￿) = Nl: (9)
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, chap 16, p. 493), the policymaker
budget constraint can be obtained by summing the individual budget con-
20straints (2) and subtracting the market clearing condition (9):
NtX(t;￿) = T + Ns￿
j (￿); (10)
where ￿j (￿) = [b c(￿) ￿ c("j)]X(t;￿). This determines the amount of
lump-sum transfers T j (￿) ￿ NtX(t;￿) ￿ Ns￿j (￿) which will be handed
back to households by the policymaker of type "j perceived to be "b with
probability ￿. Hence, when ￿j (￿) < 0, revenues from the environmental tax
are used to ￿nance losses in pro￿t due to households￿misperceptions.
Using (9), the social welfare when the policymaker￿ s type is "j and is
perceived by households to be "b with probability ￿ upon seeing the tax
t, can be written in the following reduced form function W(t;"j;￿) : T ￿
f"g;"bg ￿ [0;1] ! [0;+1):
W(t;"











The expression given in (12) shows that social welfare has two compo-
nents: ￿rst, private welfare u(X(t;￿))￿b c(￿)X(t;￿) which depends on house-
holds￿perception of the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment, and sec-
ond, environmental welfare ￿"jX(t;￿) which directly depends on the true
21policymaker￿ s concern for the environment.
Welfare functions W(t;"j;￿) can be shown to satisfy the following single-
crossing property which will prove crucial in much of the subsequent analysis:
Wt"j(t;"
j;￿) > 0: (13)
Proof :























Xt(t;￿) + X(t;￿) + vt(t;￿)
￿
: (15)











As Xt(t;￿) < 0 (see (5)), Wt"j(t;"j;￿) = ￿NXt(t;￿) > 0. Q.E.D.
22In the present context, the single-crossing property (13) guarantees that
the brown policymaker is more inclined than her green counterpart to increase
tax because the resulting decrease in consumption reduces more polluting
wastes. A straightforward consequence is that the brown policymaker has
a greater incentive for using environmental tax as a signaling device that
informs households about her true concern for the environment.
3 The discretionary tax policy
To see the e⁄ect of households￿misperception of the policymaker￿ s concern
for the environment, consider the situation in which households make their
consumption decision without knowledge of the policymaker￿ s choice of tax,
say because the policymaker cannot make binding commitments on the level
of the environmental tax. When environmental tax has no commitment value,
the policymaker￿ s behavior provides no information on her environmental
concern and households￿inferences are consequenceless. This makes relevant
to use the standard concept of a Bayesian equilibrium. Under a discretionary
regime of environmental tax, a (pure-strategy) Bayesian equilibrium is a set
23of strategies f(tj(￿0))j=b;g;(Xi(￿0))i=1;2:::;Ng such that :
















￿0(c("b) + tb(￿0)) + (1 ￿ ￿0)(c("g) + tg(￿0))
￿





Lemma 1 states the optimal values of the environmental tax under a
discretionary regime, to the extent that problem (17) admits an interior
solution. It turns out that "g ￿ "b
N > 0 is a su¢ cient condition for tj(￿0) to
be an interior solution whatever ￿0 2 [0;1] and j = b;g.















If "g ￿ "b
N > 0, then for any ￿0 2 [0;1] and j = b;g, tj(￿0) > 0.
Proof :
From (16), the necessary condition for optimality is t +
b "(￿0)





. Solving this condition for t yields
24the discretionary tax tj(￿0). The second-order condition for welfare max-
imization when evaluated at the optimum yields Wtt(t;"j;￿0) = Xt(t;￿0)
which is negative (see (5)), due to both the assumptions of quasi-linear
preferences and the concavity of u(x). Q.E.D.
When the pollution tax has no commitment value, the optimal discre-
tionary tax is equal to the marginal environmental damage "j less the part of
pollution
b "(￿0)
N that is internalized by each household given his prior probabil-
ity that the policymaker is brown. This is reminiscent of Diamond￿ s (1973)
result that the optimal tax is a weighted average of the externalities, the
weight of each household "j
N being corrected for the household￿ s mispercep-
tion b "(￿0). If households￿perceptions were accurate, then b "(￿0) = "j and the
optimal discretionary tax would be N￿1
N "j, as in Diamond (1973). A common
assumption in the public economics literature is that households do not take
into account the adverse e⁄ect of their dirty consumption on the environment
(see, for instance, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994)). Such an assump-
tion would impose here that N approaches in￿nity. Suppose that households
ignore environmental externalities and perfectly know the policymaker￿ s con-
cern for the environment, then the optimal discretionary tax is simply the
Pigovian level "j that fully internalizes the marginal environmental damage
(see, for comparison, equation (6) in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) to the
extent that the marginal utility of income in the present context is given
by Ul(x;l;E) = ￿1). In some sense, the expression of tj(￿0) in Lemma 1
25involves a ￿￿scal illusion￿in the spirit of Filimon et alii (1982), where this
notion is restricted here to some di⁄erence in beliefs between households and
bureaucrats about the environmental damage.
Interestingly enough, the present model satis￿es a property of stochastic
dominance, at least for values of the tax higher than the optimal discretionary
tax, which is known to be essential for whom is familiar with standard sig-
naling games.





holds, then W￿(t;"j;￿) > 0.
Proof :






















From (7) and the envelope theorem, v￿(t;￿) = ￿
￿￿
"b ￿ "g￿
=N + c("b) ￿ c("g)
￿
X(t;￿).
Recall from (5) that
X￿(t;￿) =
c("b)￿c("g)+("b￿"g)=N





















26As tj(￿) = "j ￿
b "(￿)





W￿(t;"j;￿) > 0, provided that condition (6)
holds. Q.E.D.
Property 1 states that, given any tax higher than the optimal discre-
tionary tax, social welfare is higher when households believe the policymaker
more likely to be brown. An increase in ￿ has two e⁄ects. First, under As-
sumption (6), it raises the demand for the polluting good. In equilibrium,
taxes are such that this e⁄ect on welfare is equal to zero. Second, by chang-
ing ￿, the policymaker may in￿ uence households￿perception of the polluting
good price. An increase in ￿ makes the polluting good more attractive by
modifying households￿expectations on b c(￿), thereby raising the private com-
ponent of social welfare (see (12)). Consequently, if households infer from
any deviation of the pollution tax above the optimal discretionary level tj(￿)
that the policymaker is brown with probability ￿, then the green policymaker
may have an incentive to withhold the truth from households. Consider in
particular the case in which households ignore environmental externalities,
that is, 1=N is null. Suppose further that information is perfect and the
policymaker is green, then it is optimal for the latter to set the Pigovian
tax "g which fully internalizes the marginal environmental damage. Given
this tax however, the true information, i. e. ￿ = 0, is the worst belief, as
shown by W￿("g;"g;￿) = ￿N(c("b) ￿ c("g))X(t = "g;￿) > 0. Indeed, social
welfare would be higher if environmental damage were to be overestimated
27by households, that is, for any ￿ inside (0;1]. The illusion that the price of
the polluting good b c(￿) is lower than c("g) boosts the private component of
social welfare.
Stochastic dominance is an essential structural property of standard sig-










j;￿) > 0: (21)
Hence, for any t, ￿ = 0 is the least favorable belief for the policymaker,
whatever her environmental concern. Figure 1 depicts possible shapes for
the social welfare functions W(t;"j;￿); for j = b;g and ￿ = 0;1.
4 The enforceable tax policy
Let us now consider that commitments are feasible through legal arrange-
ments or other procedures, so that environmental tax is enforceable. Then,
the policymaker￿ s choice of environmental tax can now be observed by house-
holds before they make their consumption decision. This gives the model a
structure of signaling game, for which strategies must form a perfect Bayesian
7This property is implied by assumptions A1￿ , A2 and A3 taken together page 392
in Cho and Sobel (1990) or directly assumed page 255 in Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1993.)
28equilibrium. As suggested by Harsanyi (1967-8), such a game of incomplete
information can be replaced by a game of complete but imperfect information
which unfolds in three stages. First, ￿Nature￿draws a type "j of policymaker
from the set f"g;"bg according to the probability distribution ￿0. Second,
the policymaker learns her environmental preferences and imposes the tax on
the polluting good. After observing this tax, households in the third stage
rely on their inferences upon the true value of "j to make their consumption
decision. Let ￿(t) : (0;1)￿T ! [0;1] denote the households￿posterior belief
that the policymaker is of type "b which updates the prior ￿0 when the tax
is t. We assume that, after observing tax choice t, households and ￿rms hold
the same belief about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment and de-
￿ne b c(￿(t)) ￿ ￿(t)c("b)+(1￿￿(t))c("g) as the expected cost of producing the
polluting good after observing t. The policymaker, in turn, must take into
account how her choice of tax in￿ uences households￿inferences. Restricting





i (t;b "(￿￿ (t))))i=1;2:::;N
￿
and a probability distri-
bution ￿￿ (t) such that, at any stage of the game, strategies must be optimal
given beliefs:
Condition 1: optimality condition for the policymaker.







29Condition 2: perfection condition for the households.
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Condition 1 demands that the policymaker￿ s choice of tax maximizes
social welfare given that households respond optimally. Condition 2 states
that households￿consumption of the polluting good should maximize their
utility given their beliefs induced by the policymaker￿ s behavior. Finally,
condition 3 requires the households￿posterior beliefs about "j to be formed
from their prior beliefs by using Bayes￿rule for the policymakers￿equilibrium
strategies. As usual, households are assumed to revise their beliefs in an
arbitrary way o⁄ the equilibrium path.
304.1 Separating and pooling equilibria
Our interest now is not really a characterization of all perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in the model but rather a characterization of the set of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium taxes. From assumption (21), we can without loss of gener-







households￿ out-of-equilibrium beliefs are always the least favorable for the
policymaker. Such beliefs are the strongest too in that, if a policymaker of
any type does not have an incentive to set t when ￿(t) > 0; then she will
not have an incentive when ￿(t) = 0, since social welfare is lower. Therefore




b denote the separating equilibrium taxes when the poli-
cymaker is green and brown, respectively. The corresponding equilibrium
welfares are W ￿
g and W ￿
b . The best choice for the green policymaker is to set
t￿
g equal to the symmetric information Pigovian level that fully internalizes
the environmental damage when households￿perceptions of this damage are
accurate, i. e., tg(0) = "g ￿ "g
N.










Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a separating equilibrium in
31which t￿
g 6= tg(0). As households￿ expectations are correct at equilibrium,
the resulting social welfare is W(t;"g;0) which is strictly lower than
W(tg(0);"g;0). Then, the policymaker would have an incentive to deviate to
tg(0) whatever the households￿inference ￿ from observing tg(0). Indeed,











From Property 1, W￿(tg(0);"g;￿) > 0, thus,
R 0
￿ W￿(tg(0);"g;￿)d￿ < 0 and
W(tg(0);"g;0) < W(tg(0);"g;￿). If t￿
g 6= tg(0), then
W(t￿
g;"g;0) < W(tg(0);"g;0) and so W(t￿
g;"g;0) < W(tg(0);"g;￿). It
turns out that t￿
g = tg(0) can be supported as the only separating
equilibrium tax for the green policymaker, given the assumption ￿(t) = 0
for all t 6= t￿
g since W(t;"g;0) < W(tg(0);"g;0).Q.E.D.
Consider now situations where households believe they know the true en-
vironmental concern of the policymaker. If households assign probability 1 to
the brown policymaker while the policymaker is in fact green, demand for the
polluting good after observing some tax t is X(t;1) and social welfare is given
by W(t;"g;1). On the other hand, if households are wrongly convinced that
the policymaker is green, demand and social welfare are respectively X(t;0)
and W(t;"b;0). Setting the optimal discretionary tax tb(0) would yield a wel-
fare of W(tb(0);"b;0), which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost for
32the brown policymaker to fully transmit information on her environmental
concern.
To achieve separation, the brown policymaker must choose an environ-
mental tax t￿













Condition (22) is an incentive compatibility (IC) constraint ensuring that
the green policymaker has no incentive to lie about her true environmen-
tal concern. She must choose the symmetric information Pigovian tax and
fully reveal information on her concern for the environment rather than trick
households into believing that she is brown by setting t￿
b. As can be seen in
Figure 1, the IC constraint de￿nes a set Tg of possible taxes t￿
b that satisfy
(22). Note that assumption (6) implies that t0 ￿ u0(0) ￿ c("g) ￿
b "(0)
N < t1 ￿
u0(0)￿c("b)￿
b "(1)
N . The equality version of (22) admits an upper root which









will be shown that the tax tc set by the brown policymaker corresponds in
some circumstances to the so-called ￿least-cost separating equilibrium￿which
has received much emphasis in the work of Spence (1974), Riley (1979) and
Cho-Kreps (1987), among others.
33The second condition (23) is an individual rationality (IR) constraint
guaranteeing that the brown policymaker would rather charge t￿
b and transmit
all information than let households wrongly perceive her as green and opti-
mize accordingly. Let Tb denote the interval of taxes for which condition (23)









In order to fully reveal that environment is dirty, the policymaker must
choose t￿
b in the interval Tg\Tb provided that the latter is non empty. This
interval is depicted in Figure 1. Proposition 1 demonstrates the existence of
a class of separating equilibria.







then there exists a continuum of separating equilibria in which the green pol-
icymaker sets t￿
g = tg(0) and the brown policymaker sets t￿
b 2 [tc;td).
Proof :




















From Lemma 1, tb(0) = "b ￿ "g
N > tg(0) = "g ￿ "g
N. Moreover, the single-
crossing property (13) guarantees that, for all ￿ 2 [0;1],





Wt"(t;";1)d"dt > 0; (27)
and so
tg < tb: (28)

















to the extent that at least one of these values is not zero. Thus, Tg\Tb =
[tg;tb) 6= 0.
Clearly, any tax t￿
b 2 [tg;tb) can be supported as a separating equilibrium
for the brown policymaker by out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that
￿￿(t) = 0 for all t 6= t￿
b since W(t;"b;0) ￿ W(td;"b;1) < W(t￿
b;"b;1).
Q.E.D.
As a result, there always exists an environmental tax that fully informs
35households about the policymaker￿ s concern for the environment, regardless
of whether she is green or brown. The separating equilibrium tax chosen
by the green policymaker is uniquely set equal to the symmetric informa-
tion Pigovian level tg(0) = "g ￿ "g
N. By contrast, there is a whole range of
separating equilibrium taxes for the brown policymaker, namely [tg;tb):
Note that if we were to consider the case in which the policymaker￿ s pri-
vate valuation b " is a random variable described by a cumulative distribution




property (13) and the property of stochastic dominance (21) taken together
would be su¢ cient to guarantee the existence of separating equilibria (see
Mailath (1987) for a detailed proof).
The next corollary gives su¢ cient conditions for the taxes signaling the
brown policymaker to deviate from the symmetric information Pigovian level.
This is precisely the situation for which Figure 1 is drawn. It arises when the
parameter values of the model are such that the green policymaker would
￿envy￿the welfare attained by the brown policymaker with her symmetric
information Pigovian level, that is, W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0).
Corollary 1: Assume (21) and (13) hold. If u0(x) > "g + c("g) and
X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0), then t￿
b > tb(1).
Proof :
If u0(x) > "g + c("g) and X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0), then
36R X(tb(1);1)























("g + c("g))X(tb(1);1); on the other hand, we have
W(tg(0);"g;0) = u(X(tg(0);0)) ￿ ("g + c("g))X(tg(0);0).
As a result, W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0). Thus, tb(1) violates the IC
condition for separation given by (24), hence tb(1) < tg.
Q.E.D.
The condition that u0(x) > "g + c("g) means that the marginal util-
ity from consuming the polluting good is higher than the marginal social
cost of producing this good when the policymaker is green. If moreover
the socially optimal demand is higher with the brown policymaker than
with the green one, that is, X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0), then the green pol-
icymaker has all reasons to envy her brown counterpart in the sense that
W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0). In such circumstances, the green policy-
maker might be tempted to set the high tax tb(1) if doing so could trick
households into believing she is brown. As previously seen, this would boost
the private component of social welfare. To prevent such a masquerade, the
brown policymaker must su⁄er a welfare loss too high to be judged worth-
while by the green policymaker. As a result, the taxes signaling the brown
policymaker are set above the symmetric information Pigovian level, i. e.,
37tb(1) = "b ￿ "b
N. In such a case, the policymaker reveals she is brown by
overtaxing relative to the level that would fully internalize the environmen-
tal damage were households￿perceptions of this damage the same as the
policymaker￿ s perception. Hence, signaling a high environmental damage
may entail a welfare sacri￿ce to tell households the truth about the actual
policymaker￿ s concern for the environment: the policymaker must reduce
consumption even more than what would prevail if households and the poli-
cymaker were to have the same information about environmental damage. A
straightforward consequence is that the amount of pollution associated with
t￿
b when W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0), i. e., "bX(t￿
b;1), must be lower than
the amount of pollution obtained with the symmetric information Pigovian
tax, i. e., "bX(tb(1);1).
The tax can transmit all information on the policymaker￿ s concern for
the environment because, from the single-crossing property stated in (13),
increasing tax is more damaging to the green policymaker than it is to the
brown policymaker. This implies that the brown policymaker may reduce
consumption and curb pollution more than what would be implied by the
Pigovian principle under symmetric information.
The existence of separating equilibria does not dismiss pooling equilibria.
Let t￿ denote the uninformative tax that gives a pooling equilibrium. Since
it is the same tax levied by the policymaker whatever her environmental
concern, the households￿posterior beliefs after observing the tax t￿ are the
38same as their prior beliefs. To be part of a pooling equilibrium, t￿
g must






j;0);j = b;g: (29)
What (29) says is that the policymaker would rather impose t￿
g and con-
ceal information on her true environmental concern than make households
be sure that she is green and optimize accordingly.

















(see Figure 2). Integrating
and using the single-crossing property along the same line as for the proof of
Proposition 1, it can easily be shown that tb (￿0) < tg (￿0). The next propo-
sition characterizes the set of pooling equilibrium taxes, which is depicted in
Figure 2.




can be supported as a pooling equilibrium by beliefs ￿￿(t) = 0 for all t 6= t￿.
However, many pooling equilibria can be argued to involve unreasonable
beliefs to the extent that they are not robust to standard re￿nement crite-
rions. Many separating equilibria can be discarded in the same way, as will
be shown in the next section.
394.2 Equilibrium selection
The logic of Undefeated Equilibrium (UE) proposed by Mailath, Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993) will be applied here to eliminate all the
equilibria, separating and pooling, which are Pareto dominated by other
equilibria. The main reason for emphasizing undefeated equilibria here is to
formalize the idea that the policymaker ought to be able to in￿ uence house-
holds￿beliefs because she is in position of relative power. Before learning
the actual damage of the environment, the policymaker could commit to re-
strict herself to the set of UE taxes when levying environmental taxes, and




j as the equilibrium social welfares when the policy-
maker of type "j imposes taxes t￿
j and t
#
j respectively. Furthermore, let ￿￿ (t)
be the posterior belief held by consumers after observing t, that sustains t￿
j as
an equilibrium. Following Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993),
the equilibrium involving the tax t￿
j survives the UE criterion, provided that











































The underlying idea is that the existence of an equilibrium with t
#
j would
induce the policymaker j to deviate from t￿
j since it would yield at least
as much welfare. Requirement (31) is similar to that imposed by Cho and
Kreps (1987) to meet the ￿intuitive criterion￿ . Some persuasive arguments
in favor of the UE criterion can be found in Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1993). Note that using this criterion for signaling games is in
the same spirit as requiring an allocation to be renegociation-proof in an
informed principal￿ s model with common values (see the concept of Weakly
Interim E¢ ciency in Maskin and Tirole (1992)).
To re￿ne the set of equilibrium taxes, we shall focus on the most inter-
esting case where W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0), i. e., the only way for a
policymaker to reveal her environmental concern is to distort the environmen-
tal tax above the symmetric information Pigovian level tb(1). (See Corollary
1 for the conditions under which the previous inequality is satis￿ed)
41Proposition 3: If u0(x) > "g + c("g) and X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0),
then all the separating equilibrium taxes are defeated by the following pair of
least-costly separating equilibrium taxes:
￿ t￿
g = tg(0) for the green policymaker,
￿ and t￿
b = tg for the brown policymaker.
Associated with these taxes, the damages from pollution are respectively:
￿ "gX(tg(0);"g) with the green policymaker, which is the same as that
allowed by the symmetric information Pigovian tax;
￿ "bX(tc;"b) with the brown policymaker, which is lower than that allowed
by the symmetric information Pigovian tax.
Proof :
Assume u0(x) > "g + c("g) and X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0). Suppose that
separation is achieved in equilibrium at t￿
b > tg. From Corollary 1, we
have tg > tb(1), hence W(t￿
b;"b;1) < W(tg;"b;1). The out-of-equilibrium
beliefs that support t￿




< 1 at tg otherwise the brown policymaker would
deviate to tg. Then, from (31), the separating equilibrium with t￿
b is
defeated by the separating equilibrium with tg . Q.E.D.
42There are in￿nitely many separating equilibrium taxes at which the brown
policymaker can reveal her environmental concern. However, from require-
ment (31), the separating equilibrium entailing the least-costly signal de-
feats all the other separating equilibria. As W(tb(1);"g;1) > W(tg(0);"g;0),
the only way for a brown policymaker to fully reveal her concern for the
environment at an environmental tax higher than if she were green, is to
distort the tax above the symmetric information Pigovian level tb(1). Oth-
erwise, the policymaker would ￿nd it optimal to impose the high tax even
if she were green. Thus, the brown policymaker must reduce consumption
even more than what would require the Pigovian principle under symmet-
ric information. By setting tg, the policymaker minimizes the welfare loss
from reducing consumption. This loss is then measured by the di⁄erence
W(tb(1);"b;1) ￿ W(tg;"b;1).
Let us now return to the analysis of pooling equilibria. Pooling with a
tax t￿ is potentially costly for the brown policymaker. The welfare di⁄eren-
tial relative to the socially optimal situation under symmetric information is
then given by W(tb(1);"b;1) ￿ W(t￿;"b;￿0). Requirement (31) imposes the





If inequality (32) holds, then social welfare achieved by the brown policy-
43maker with the pooling equilibrium price t￿ is higher than with the separating
equilibrium price tg. As the green policymaker will also prefer to duplicate
t￿ than to reveal information, requirement (32) guarantees that the pooling
equilibrium defeats the least-costly separating equilibrium. According to the
logic advocated by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993), it is
more ￿plausible￿that, in such a case, the policymaker will choose to provide
no information in equilibrium. Clearly, condition (32) will hold for su¢ -






The right-hand side of equality (33) is the socially optimal welfare un-
der a discretionary regime when the policymaker is brown and is thought at
the same time to be brown with probability ￿: this is the maximum that
the brown policymaker can obtain by holding back information. Consider
Figure 3. The critical value ￿ is the level of beliefs such that the brown
policymaker is indi⁄erent between revealing her concern for the environment
at the least cost and concealing information about it. In other words, when
households assign probability ￿ to the brown policymaker, the latter is in-
di⁄erent between fully revealing information with a tax tg or providing no
information with tb(￿). If ￿0 is strictly lower than ￿, then inequality (32)
is violated whatever the uninformative tax t￿ considered. Consequently, the
44policymaker is expected to transmit, in equilibrium, all information on her
environmental concern. The result is reversed for values of ￿0 higher than
￿. Such ￿pessimistic￿beliefs held by households about the environmental
concern of the policymaker do not allow for the policymaker￿ s choice of tax
to fully reveal information because these beliefs increase the opportunity
cost of fully revealing information for the brown policymaker. Instead, the
policymaker will choose to conceal information by choosing the same tax in
equilibrium whatever her type.


















j;￿0);j = b;g: (34)
Thus, all the pooling equilibria involving a price either strictly lower than
tg(￿0) or strictly higher than tb(￿0) and a prior probability ￿0 2 (￿;1), are
defeated by the pooling equilibrium involving the price tj(￿0) and the prior
probability ￿0. Figure 3 illustrates this case. Finally, Proposition 4 presents
all the equilibria surviving the re￿nement criterion proposed by Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993).
Proposition 4:
Assume that u0(x) > "g + c("g) and X(tb(1);1) > X(tg(0);0).




2. If ￿0 > ￿, then a continuum of UE exists, which is characterized by





The selection of UE taxes allows to mitigate the current concentration on
the least-costly separating equilibrium, which involves the taxes t￿
g = tg(0)
and t￿
b = tg in the present case, and turn attention to pooling equilibrium
taxes, which are no less economically intuitive.
On the one hand, when households a priori believe less likely the policy-
maker to be brown, then the latter must impose a welfare loss to households
in order to fully reveal that she is actually brown. In such a case, the envi-
ronmental tax is distorted above the symmetric information Pigovian level.
Households incur a signaling cost to learn that the polluting good is cheaper
than they initially thought. Obviously, the pollution level that results from
the environmental tax levied by the brown policymaker falls below the sym-
metric information Pigovian level. Overtaxation and underpollution with
the brown policymaker are necessary to remove the incentive for the green
policymaker to lie about her environmental concern.
On the other hand, when households a priori believe more likely the
policymaker to be brown, the emergence of separating equilibrium taxes is
dubious to the extent that telling the truth has become more costly for
the brown policymaker than concealing her true environmental concern from
46households. Then, the policymaker can be expected to provide no informa-
tion on her true environmental concern and pooling equilibria will prevail.
In any such undefeated pooling equilibrium, the brown (resp. green) policy-
maker would rather distort the environmental tax below (resp. above) the
Pigovian tax, which fully internalizes the marginal social damage from pol-
lution under symmetric information. As a result, when the incentive for the
green policymaker to lie about her environmental concern fails to be removed
in equilibrium, there is more pollution with the brown policymaker and less
pollution with the green policymaker relative to what the Pigovian principle
under symmetric information would allow.
5 Conclusion
We have built a model of environmental tax on the assumption that a poli-
cymaker newly in o¢ ce has better information regarding her environmental
concern than would households. The case of enforceable environmental taxes
is emphasized to answer the question of how much information environmen-
tal taxes alone can convey from the policymaker to households. This extends
earlier analytical work on optimal environmental taxation by allowing for the
possibility that environmental tax might be used by policymakers as a signal
for her environmental concern.
In such a context, a green policymaker has an incentive to raise envi-
47ronmental tax above the Pigovian level that would prevail under symmetric
information, in an attempt to trick households into believing that she has
as little concern about the environment as a brown policymaker. Such a lie
is expected to boost the private component of social welfare. The choice of
the environmental tax may be distorted by the brown policymaker￿ s need to
transmit information on her true environmental concern.
Various results were found.
￿ Tax distortions are shown to emerge when the welfare obtained with
the brown policymaker￿ s Pigovian tax makes the green policymaker
envious.
￿ Environmental taxes can fully reveal information on the policymaker￿ s
concern for the environment provided that the green policymaker, ￿rstly,
su⁄ers a greater welfare loss from increasing tax, and secondly, gener-
ates a lower environmental damage with higher cleanup costs than
does a brown policymaker.
￿ Selection of UE shows that households￿prior beliefs of a brown policy-
maker must be su¢ ciently small for environmental taxes to fully reveal
information. Otherwise, the selected UE are pooling, hence environ-
mental taxes provide no information to households.
￿ The brown policymaker must distort her tax above the symmetric in-
formation Pigovian tax to be perfectly identi￿ed by households who
48unrealistically believe her to be green. By contrast, the brown policy-
maker ￿nds it optimal to distort her tax below the symmetric informa-
tion Pigovian tax and convey no information to households who believe
more likely that she is brown. In such a pooling equilibrium, the green
policymaker￿ s choice of environmental tax is distorted upward.
It would be worthwhile to examine whether these predictions are robust
to more general assumptions. In particular, the signaling framework could be
extended into a dynamic setting similar to that in Noldeke and Van Damme
(1990), which would allow markets to clear not only before but also after
the environmental types of policymaker have sorted themselves. Another
dynamic extension reminiscent of Bagwell and Riordan (1991) would be to
consider that some economic agents are perfectly informed about the envi-
ronmental concern of the policymaker and that their number grows as time
passes. Then, it would become even more di¢ cult for the green policymaker
to trick households into believing that she is brown and the brown policy-
maker might be able to signal her true environmental concern with a smaller
tax distortion. Finally, one intriguing extension would be to investigate a
model in which other decision variables than the environmental tax might be
simultaneously used as signals of environmental quality.
49References
[1] AKERLOF, G. A. (1970), ￿The Market for ￿ Lemons￿ : Qualitative Un-
certainty and the Market Mechanism￿ , Quarterly Journal of Economics
84, 488-500.
[2] ALESINA A. and A. CUKIERMAN (1990), ￿The Politics of Ambigu-
ity￿ , Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 829-850.
[3] ATKINSON A. B. and J. E. STIGLITZ (1980), Lectures on Public Eco-
nomics, McGraw-Hill, London.
[4] BAGWELL, K. and M. H. RIORDAN (1991), ￿High and Declining
Prices Signal Product Quality￿ , American Economic Review 81, 224-
239.
[5] BARON, D. P. (1985), ￿Regulation of Prices and Pollution under In-
complete Information￿ , Journal of Public Economics 28, 211-231.
[6] BARRO R. (1986), , ￿Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with
Incomplete Information￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics 17, 3-20.
[7] BARNETT, A. (1980), ￿The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly￿ ,
American Economic Review 70, 1037-1041.
[8] BARIGOZZI, F. and B. VILLENEUVE (1994), ￿The Signaling E⁄ect
of Tax Policy￿ , Journal of Public EconomicTheory, forthcoming.
50[9] BOVENBERG, A. L. and R. A. de MOOIJ (1994), ￿Environmental
Levies and Distortionary Taxation￿ , American Economic Review 84,
1085-1089.
[10] BOVENBERG, A. L. and F. van der PLOEG (1994), ￿Environmental
Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World￿ ,
Journal of Public Economics 55, 349-390.
[11] BOYER, M. and J.-J. LAFFONT (1999), ￿Towards a Political Theory of
the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation￿ , RAND Journal
of Economics 30, 137-157.
[12] BUCHANAN, J. M. (1969), ￿External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes
and Market Structures￿ , American Economic Review 59, 174-177.
[13] CHO, I-K. and D. KREPS (1987), ￿Signaling Games and Stable Equi-
libria￿ , Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 179-221.
[14] CHO, I-K. and J. SOBEL (1990), ￿Strategic Stability and Uniqueness
in Signaling Games￿ , Journal of Economic Theory 50, 381-413.
[15] COPELAND, B. R. and M. S. TAYLOR (1994), ￿North-South Trade
and the Environment￿ , Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 755-787.
[16] DIAMOND, P. A. (1973), ￿Consumption Externalities and Imperfect
Corrective Pricing￿ , Bell Journal of Economics 4, 526-538.
51[17] FILIMON, R., ROMER T. and H. ROSENTHAL (1982) , ￿Asymmet-
ric Information and Agenda Control: The bases of monopoly power in
public spending￿ , Journal of Public Economics 17, 51-70.
[18] HARSANYI, J. (1967-8), ￿Games with Incomplete Information Played
by ￿ Bayesian￿Players, Parts I, II and III￿ , Management Science 14,
159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
[19] LAFFONT, J.- J. (1993), ￿A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation￿ in C. Dosi and T. Tomasi (eds), Nonpoint Source Pollution
Regulation: Issues and Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 39-66.
[20] LEWIS, T., R. (1996), ￿Protecting the Environment when Costs and
bene￿ts are privately Known￿ , Rand Journal of Economics 27, n￿ 4,
819-847.
[21] LOMBORG, B. (2001), The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge
University Press.
[22] MAILATH G. (1987), ￿Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with
a Continuum of Types￿ , Econometrica 55, 1349-1365.
[23] MAILATH, G., M. OKUNO-FUJIWARA and A. POSTLEWAITE
(1993), ￿Belief-Based Re￿nements in Signaling Games￿ , Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 60, 241-276.
52[24] MASKIN, E. and J. TIROLE (1992), ￿The Principal-Agent Relationship
with an Informed Principal 2: Common Values￿ , Econometrica 58, 379-
410.
[25] MILGROM, P. and J. ROBERTS (1982), ￿Limit pricing and Entry un-
der Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis￿ , Econometrica
50, 443-459.
[26] MILGROM, P. and J. ROBERTS (1986), ￿Price and Advertising Signals
of Product Quality￿ , Journal of Political Economy 94, 796-821.
[27] NOLDEKE, G. and E. VAN DAMME (1990), ￿Signalling in a Dynamic
Labour Market￿ , Review of Economic Studies 57, 1-23.
[28] PEARCE, D. (1991), ￿The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global
Warming￿ , The Economic Journal 8101, 938-948.
[29] RILEY J. (1979), ￿Informational Equilibrium￿ , Econometrica 47, 331-
360.
[30] SPENCE, A. M. (1974), Market Signaling. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
[31] VICKERS J. (1986), ￿Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with
Incomplete Information￿ , Oxford Economic Papers 38, 443-455.
53[32] YU, Z. (2005), ￿Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and In-
direct Competition for Political In￿ uence￿ , Review of Economic Studies
72, 269-286.
54